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IV. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
This appeal arises from a summary judgment for Defendants, The Board of 
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County ("the Board") and Commissioners Randy 
Horiuchi and Brent Overson as individuals. The appeal presents important issues of 
appellate jurisdiction, the extent to which parties are bound by their attorneys1 
unqualified and on-the-record statements addressed to and relied upon by the Court 
and opposing parties, and absolute legislative immunity. In bringing this vexatious and 
groundless appeal, Plaintiffs have repeatedly and egregiously misstated the procedural 
history of this case and have involved the individual commissioners despite their 
absolute legislative immunity and the fact iha* no claims were ever property rr^de 
against tnem. Commissioners Randy Horsuchi ana Brent Overscn, therefore, 
respectfully request oral argument. 
V. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case on its face meets the jurisdictional requirements of 78-2-2(4) and 78-
2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code. However, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, this Court lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiffs filed their notice of 
appeal of the trial court's April 14, 1995 order en September 27, 1S95, over four months 
beyond the jurisdictional deadline. 
VI- STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the Plaintiffs' four-month delay in filing a notice of appeal preclude 
this court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal? 
a. The standard of review for this issue is de novo since it involves a 
question solely of this Court's jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Glezos v. 
Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230, 1232-34 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
2. Does the trial court's January 30, 1995 order from the bench prohibiting 
Plaintiffs from amending the complaint to add damage claims require this Court to affirm 
the trial court's ruling as to damage claims asserted in violation of that order? 
a. Plaintiffs have not challenged the January 30, 1995 order either in 
their notice of appeal or their brief. Nevertheless, a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion to amend is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. 
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Mountain 
Am. Credit Union v. McClellan. 854 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 862 
P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). 
3. Did the on-the-record statement of Plaintiffs' counsel that "we are not 
attacking that ordinance in the .amended pomplajnt," and his silence when tne trial court 
later stated that Plaintiffs did not seek to invalidate the vacation ordinance, justiiy The 
trial court's dismissal of the claims relating to the vacation ordinance? 
a. The standard of review for this issue snould take into account the 
trial court's superior position in observing the demeanor, tone, and context incident to 
the open-court waiver by Plaintiffs' counsel. u[T]he trial judge has observed 'facts ' such 
as [counsel's] appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that 
cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts." State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). Thus, a measure of deference should be 
accorded the trial court's ruling. 
4. Should the triai court's ruling as to the individual commissioners be 
affirmed because, under the Utah Constitution, they are absolutely immune from 
lawsuits arising out of their legislative role in passing the vacation ordinance? 
a. The standard of review of this issue is de novo. The 
commissioners need not have raised the issue before the trial court. First, this Court 
may affirm the trial court's ruling on any ground, even one not relied upon by the trial 
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court. Higqins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 240-41 (Utah 1993); Branch v. 
Western Petroleum, Inc.. 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982). Moreover, the individual 
commissioners did not raise their absolute legislative immunity defense in reliance upon 
the statements of Plaintiffs' counsel and the trial court that the Plaintiffs would not 
pursue damage claims and claims challenging the validity of the vacation ordinance. 
Thus, the commissioners had neither the need nor the opportunity to raise the defense. 
4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 267 (1993); cf. State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37,40 (Utah 1996) 
(ruling thai ineffective assistance of counsel claim need not be raised in trial court). 
Also, this Court should review this issue because the substantial constitutional rights of 
the commissioners are at stake, and the record contains all the underlying facts 
necessary for the issue's resolution. 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 267 (1993). 
VII. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15. 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Neerinqs v. Utah State Bar 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 1991). 
Morgan v. Morgan, 875 P.2d 563 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 
1994). 
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION 
IN COURT BELOW. 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment awarded to the Board and the 
individual commissioners in a lawsuit arising out of an ordinance that partially vacated a 
roadway adjacent to the Plaintiffs' property. The order on appeal, signed and entered 
by the trial court on April 14, 1995, states that 
[Plaintiffs' claims as contained within [Plaintiffs' second 
amended complaint, relating to that certain Salt Lake County 
Ordinance as passed by the Board of Salt Lake County 
Commissioners, to-wit, ordinance number 1275 (corrected), 
dated August 10, 1995, . . . [the vacation ordinance], be and 
the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
(R. at 648.) The trial court also dismissed a number of Plaintiffs' claims without 
prejudice. (R. at 647-49.) None of the claims dismissed without prejudice, however, 
are at issue on appeal. (R. at 703-08.) 
On June 20, 1994, Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint against the Board and the 
commissioners seeking to invalidate an ordinance passed by the Board at a public 
hearing on May 25, 1994. (R. at 1-9.) The ordinance vacated an eight foot wide 
portion of North Union Avenue and permanently closed, but did not vacate, the 
remaining twenty-five foot wide section of the road running in front of Plaintiffs' property. 
(R. at 379-80.) According to Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint, the vacation and closing of 
Nortn Union Avenue improperly restricted access to their properties. (R. at 6-7.) 
Therefore, in addition to seeking the invalidation of the vacation ordinance, Plaintiffs 
also sought to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance. (R. at 7-8.) No damage claims 
against any of the Defendants were asserted. 
The Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on July 14, 1994. (R. at 89-101.) The 
only amendment involved a claim that the Defendants, in violation of statutory 
provisions regarding road vacations, failed to provide proper notice to Plaintiffs that they 
intended to vacate and close part of North Union Avenue. (R. at 91-95.) Again, no 
damage claims against any of the Defendants were asserted. 
On July 13, 1994, the Board signed and published a vacation ordinance that 
varied from the May 25, 1994 vote, the decision on which Plaintiffs predicated their 
Verified and Amended Complaints. (R. at 481-85.) On July 13, 1994, the ordinance as 
published, Ordinance No. 1270, provided for a twenty-five foot wide public roadway to 
give access to Plaintiffs' properties. (R. at 481-85.) The Ordinance provided that the 
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Plaintiffs "wilt still have direct access to 7240 South and will be provided additional 
access to the north side of the properties from 7240 South through a 25 foot wide public 
right-of-way." (R. at 159.) On August 10, 1994, the Board signed and published the 
vacation ordinance in its final form, Ordinance No. 1275, which made only technical 
changes to the previous ordinance. (R. at 157-60.) 
On November 23,1994, Plaintiffs changed their position and sought to enforce 
the vacation ordinance and, for the first time, to include claims for damages. (R. at 182-
83, 185.) On that day, Plaintiffs moved to file a Second Amended Complaint 
maintaining the same claims and allegations as the earlier complaints but adding 
damage claims and a claim for an injunction based upon the Defendants1 alleged failure 
tc enforce county ordinances. (R. at 185.) One of the ordinances the Defendants were 
alleged in the proposed Second Amended Complaint to have violated was the very 
ordinance Plaintiffs had sought to invalidate. (R. at 185, 211, 221-23.) The other 
ordinance Defendants were alleged to have violated was Ordinance No. 1186 which 
provides guidelines for roadway development. (R. at 185, 221-23, 397-411.) According 
to Plaintiffs, the public right-of-way described in Ordinance No. 1275 did not meet the 
standards for roadways set forth by the Board in Ordinance No. 1186. (R. at 221-23.) 
Thus, while the proposed Second Amended Complaint maintained Plaintiffs' claims 
challenging the validity of the vacation ordinance, it also demanded the vacation 
ordinance be enforced and enforced according to guidelines promulgated for roadway 
development. (R. at 219-20, 221-24.) 
Although Plaintiffs filed their motion to file a Second Amended Complaint on 
November 23, 1994, they did not file their necessary Notice of Claim until almost a 
month later. Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, a claimant must give notice 
to the governmental entity of her intention to file a damage claim against it before she 
actually files a claim. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11. In this case, Plaintiffs filed their 
Notice of Claim on December 19, 1994. (R. at 793-95.) 
The inconsistency within Plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended Complaint 
caused by challenging the vacation ordinance on the one hand and seeking its 
enforcement on the other was resolved on January 30, 1995, when the trial court held a 
hearing to discuss various issues including Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file their 
proposed Second Amended Complaint. (R.at 820.) On the record, the Plaintiffs' 
attorney acknowledged and resolved the inconsistency by stating that since so much of 
the development and construction of the shopping center had affected North Union 
Avenue following the Board's decision to vacate the roEO, the Plaintiffs-were r»c ionger 
seeking the invalidation of that ordinance: 
The reason we are here before you today, your Honor,, is nol 
to attack the ordinance. While the original complaint may 
have those allegations in it, your Honor, it is a mess out 
there. And what we are here today is [sic] asking the county 
to enforce its own ordinance. 
(R. at 840.) Later, counsel for Defendants sought confirmation from the trial court that 
Plaintiffs were no longer seeking to invalidate the vacation ordinance: "As I see the 
second amended complaint they are going to be filing another version of i t . . . wherein, 
as I understand it, they do not seek to invalidate the ordinance, am I correct?" (R. at 
843 ) The trial court responded, "That's what was represented." (R. at 843.) The trial 
court also confirmed that "that issue is dead." (R. at 843.) At no time during this 
clarification did Plaintiffs' attorney object or otherwise contradict the trial court's 
statements. (R. at 843.) 
The court also disposed of the damage claims in the proposed Second Amended 
Complaint by ordering that such claims could not be included. Defendants argued that, 
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Plaintiffs could not assert such claims 
before ninety days had passed from the date Plaintiffs served their Notice of Claim. (R. 
at 202, 838-39.) See Utah Code Ann § 63-30-14. Since the Plaintiffs filed their Notice 
of Claim no earlier than December 19,1994, (R. at 838-39, 793-95), the earliest that 
Plaintiffs could assert damage claims, was March 19, 1995. (R. at 839.) The trial court 
agreed and stated, "You will not be able to amend until that 90 days expires pending 
whatever the county wishes to do." (R. at 842 43.)1 In addition, after confirming that 
claims relating to the vacation ordinance were "dead;" the trial court said, "Plus I have 
told them they would amend to not include damages and so only as to the injunctive 
relief as to have the county enforce its own ordinance, that will be the limitations on the 
amendments." (R. at 843.) After the trial court had ordered Plaintiffs to omit their 
damage claims from the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs' counsel responded, 
"No problem." (R. at 843.) 
On February 10, 1995, the trial*court signed an older aiicwmg Plaintiffs to fiie 
their Second Amended Complaint. <R. at 294-95.) The orae? did not change the trial 
court's oral ruling prohibiting Plaintiffs from filing their proposed damage claims and 
vacation ordinance claims. (R. at 294-95.) Thus, following the January 30, 1995 
hearing and the February 10, 1995 order, Plaintiffs7 only remaining claim was for an 
injunction. (R. at 842-43.) No appeal was ever filed challenging the trial court's ruling 
on the Motion to Amend. 
In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs misrepresent and mis-cite the record with regard 
to the trial court's January 30, 1995 ruling. Citing the January 30, 1995 hearing 
transcript at page 843, Plaintiffs state that during that hearing, the trial court "then ruled 
that plaintiffs could file their Second Amended Complaint as submitted." (Brf. of 
Appellants at 5, 12.) This statement is patently untrue. The trial court specifically ruled 
that the issue regarding the vacation ordinance was "dead." (R. at 843.) In addition, 
the trial court ruled that Plaintiffs "will not be able to amend until that 90 days expires 
1
 Plaintiffs never filed a complaint for damages following the ninety-day waiting period. Therefore, under 
Section 63-30-15(2) of the Utah Code, which directs such claims to be filed "within one year after the 
denial period . . . has expired," Plaintiffs are forever barred from asserting those claims. 
pending whatever the county wishes to do," and that Plaintiffs "would amend to not 
include damages and so only as to the injunctive relief as to have the county enforce its 
own ordinance." (R. at 842-43.) 
On February 13, 1995, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint that violated 
the limitations ordered by the trial court and induced by Plaintiffs' counsel. (R. at 296-
311.) Despite the open-court statement by Plaintiffs' counsel and the trial court's order 
that such claims would not be included, the Second Amended Complaint contained 
language seeking to invalidate the vacation ordinance and seeking damages on the 
basis of the Defendants' alleged failure to enforce the vacation ordinance and the 
roadway development ordinance. (R,;at 304-08, 309.) 
This fact highlights another misstatement in Plaintiffs' brief to this Court. In 
paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs assert tnat when they filed their 
Second Amended Complaint on February 13, 1995; that was uthe first time [Plaintiffs] 
notified the court of [Plaintiffs' intention to seek botn compensatory and punitive 
damages." (Brf of Applts. at 12.) Nothing couid be further from the truth. In their 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint filed on 
November 23, 1994, Plaintiffs stated "[t]hat as a result of such violation, the Plaintiffs 
have sustained considerable damages, which were not plead [sic] in the complaints 
filed heretofore [sic]." (R. at 185.) Also, Plaintiffs first filed their proposed Second 
Amended Complaint which contained the proposed damage claims on December 9, 
1994. (R. at 211-26.) Moreover, as discussed above, Plaintiffs' proposed damage 
claims was a hot topic of discussion at the January 30, 1995 hearing on Plaintiffs' 
proposed Second Amended Complaint. (R. at 836-39, 842-43.) In addition, at a 
March 29, 1995 hearing, Plaintiffs admitted that their damages claims were discussed 
and prohibited. Plaintiffs' counsel stated to the trial court 
I think . . . you . . . has [sic] acknowledged that we were 
going to ask for damages in the amended complaint.... 
[W]e acknowledged that perhaps some of our claims were 
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not ripe at that point pursuant to the statute, and giving 
notice to the county of damages that we perceived we had 
incurred. 
(R. at 895.) Thus, Plaintiffs' assertion in their brief that February 13, 1995 was the first 
date on which they communicated their intention to assert damage claims is 
disingenuous at best. 
In response to Plaintiffs' violation of the trial court's order, Defendants objected in 
their Answer filed on February 27,1994: ."[Plaintiffs' counsel, admitted in open Court, 
that in obtaining permission by the Court . . . to file their second amended complaint, 
[P]laintiffs did not and would not assail the validity, and passage of the Vacation' 
ordinance. It was based upon that representation that the Court allowed [Pjlaintiffs to 
file the [S]econd [A]mended[C]omplaint." (R. at 317.) In addition, on February 27, 
1995, Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the alternative, a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, including the challenges to the vacation ordinance and the damage claims. 
(R. at 326, 333-34.) Defendants submitted affidavits in support of their motion. (R. at 
329-74.) Defendants argued that the challenges to the vacation ordinance had been 
waived by the Plaintiffs. (R. at 878-79, 880-82.) In addition, Defendants reminded the 
trial court that it had ordered the Plaintiffs "'to amend to not include damages.'" (R. at 
879.) Again, at the March 29, 1995 hearing on Defendants' motion, Plaintiffs' counsel 
admitted that the trial court had not allowed Plaintiffs to assert their damage claims. (R. 
at 895.) 
The trial court agreed with Defendants' counsel and granted their motion. (R. at 
922-23.) At the March 29, 1995 hearing, the trial court, relying upon the January 30, 
1995 hearing transcript, dismissed the claims challenging the vacation ordinance with 
prejudice and requested that Defendants' counsel prepare an order for the trial judge's 
signature. (R. at 879, 883, 922-23.) 
On April 1, 1995, Defendants' counsel mailed a proposed order to Plaintiffs' 
counsel. (R. at 647-49.) Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, Plaintiffs filed an objection to the proposed order on April 10, 1995. (R. 
at 639-40.) On April 14, 1995, Defendants submitted a "Notice of Submission of Order" 
requesting the trial court to sign the submitted order and placing the Plaintiffs' objection 
again before the trial court: "In a letter dated April 4, 1995, [Plaintiffs' counsel advised 
the undersigned that he was unwilling to approve the order as submitted on the basis 
that the cCourt did not dismiss Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.'" (R. at 644-46.) On the 
same day, the trial court signed the submitted order, dismissing Plaintiffs' vacation 
ordinance claims with prejudice and effectively disposing of Plaintiffs' April 10 objection. 
(R. at 647-49.) 
On July 12, 1995, Plaintiff Meibos filed a motion for a ruling on Plaintiffs' April 10 
objection to the proposed order. (R. at 656-58.) On September 26. 1995, the trial court 
signed an order disposing of Plaintiffs' objection. (R. at 701-02.) At a hearing held to 
discuss the issue, however, the trial court stated that its order could have no impact on 
the timeliness of Plaintiffs' appeal. (R. at 857.) 
On September 27, 1995, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal stating that Plaintiffs 
seek review only of the trial court's order dismissing their claims relating to the vacation 
ordinance with prejudice, (R. at 706-07), which was signed and entered on April 14, 
1994. 
The appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code. Defendants moved for the 
dismissal of the appeal on the basis of Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the jurisdictional 
thirty-day time limit of Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (Dfdt's Mem. 
of Pts. and Auth's In Supp. of Dfdt's Mot. to Dismiss Pltfs Appeal at 2.) In response, 
Plaintiffs asserted that in their April 10 objection, "[they] objected to the dismissal of the 
vacation ordinance claim with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure." (Applt's Memo, in Supp. of Mot. in Opp. to Applees Second Mot. to 
Dismiss at 4.) Plaintiffs also argued that since their Rule 52(b) motion tolled the time to 
file an appeal until after the trial court ruled on the motion, their notice was timely filed. 
(jdL at 4-5.) The Court reserved judgment on the issue and instructed the parties to 
raise the matter, along with the merits of the appeal, in their briefs to the Court. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The Plaintiffs are owners of real property adjacent to a portion of North Union 
Avenue. (R. at 1-2.) On February 15, 1994, Hermes Associates, Ltd, ("Hermes*) filed 
a petition for Street Vacation, seeking to vacate North Union Avenue to make way for 
the expansion of a shopping center. (R. at 489, 490.) Hermes filed the petition as 
owners of land abutting North Union Avenue. (R. at 489.) Fort Union Associates later 
became the owner of such land. (R. at 347) 
The Board published notices of a hearing to be held on the proposed vacation 
ordinance, and on May 25, 1994, a hearing was held. (R. at 347, 473-80.) At the 
hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel appeared and participated. (R. at 476-80.) Despite 
counsel's protests, the Board voted 2-1, with commissioners Horiuchi and Overson in 
the majority, to vacate an eight foot wide portion of North Union Avenue. (R. at 480.) 
The Board also decided to close a twenty-five foot wide portion of the road running 
directly in front of Plaintiffs' properties. (R. at 479-80.) However although the 
ordinances as published, Ordinance No. 1270 and 1275 (corrected), did vacate the 
eight foot wide portion of North Union Avenue and deeded that portion to Fort Union 
Associates, contrary to what Plaintiffs initially thought would occur, both Ordinance No. 
1270 and No. 1275 created a twenty-five foot public roadway to provide Plaintiffs direct 
access to their properties. (R. at 157-60, 481-85.) This road was eventually 
designated as 1070 East. 
IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' appeal must be dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction. Rule 
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appelate Procedure directs that a notice of appeal must be 
filed within thirty days of the order appealed from. In this case, Plaintiffs appeal the 
April 14, 1995 order. However, they filed their notice of appeal on September 27, 1995, 
over four months beyond the jurisdictional deadline. Moreover, no post-judgment 
motion was filed tolling the time to file the Notice of Appeal. 
With regard to Plaintiffs' damage claims, the trial court's order must be affirmed 
on the ground that Plaintiffs never challenged the trial court's January 30,1995 ruling 
prohibiting Plaintiffs from amending the Amended Complaint to file those claims. The 
trial court based its ruling on Section 63-30-14 of the Utah Code which states that no 
damage claims may be filed before the governmental entity has had ninety days in 
which to approve or deny the purported claims. Although Plaintiffs violated and ignored 
the trial court's order and purported'to include damage claims in the Second Amended 
Complaint anyway, they never challenged the court's denial of the motion to amend to 
add those claims. Therefore, the trial court's ruling as to damage claims is the law of 
the case, and this court should affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs' damage claims 
The dismissal of the Plaintiffs' challenges relating to the vacation ordinance, and 
any damage claims attendant thereto, must be affirmed on the basis of Plaintiffs' waiver 
of those claims. First, Plaintiffs, through counsel exp>essly waived those claims in 
open court. They invited the trial court and opposing counsel to believe that there were 
no such claims. Plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain about a ruling brought 
about by their own statements and conduct. Moreover, Defendants relied upon 
Plaintiffs' open court waiver to their detriment. Had Plaintiffs not waived their vacation 
ordinance claims, Defendants would have asserted defenses and would have provided 
strong arguments as to why the vacation ordinance was valid. 
Finally, the commissioners are immune from Plaintiffs' claims under the Speech 
and Debate Clause of the Utah Constitution. Under a nearly identical federal 
constitutional provision, legislators, including county legislators, have been held 
absolutely immune by eleven United States Circuit Courts of Appeal from claims* arising 
out of their legislative functions. This Court should also apply that doctrine to immunize 
the commissioners under the corresponding provision in the Utah Constitution. 
X. ARGUMENT 
A. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER PLAINTIFFS1 APPEAL 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL OVER FOUR 
MONTHS BEYOND RULE 4(a)'S THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE. 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right 
from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of 
appeal. . . shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from. 
This rule is jurisdictional, meaning that if an appeai is not filed within the thirty-day time 
limit, the appellate court cannot take jurisdiction. Nielson v. Guriey, 888 P.2d 130, 132 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In this case, the order appealed from is the April 14, 1995 order dismissing the 
Plaintiffs' claims relating to the vacation ordinance with prejudice. Thus, Plaintiffs had 
until May 14v 1995 to file a notice of claim. Plaintiffs, however, filed their notice of claim 
on September 27, 1995, over four months beyond the jurisdictional time limit. 
Plaintiffs' April 10, 1995 objection did not toll the time to file a notice of appeal. 
Plaintiffs argue that their April 10, 1995 objection was actually a motion "pursuant to 
Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Applt's Memo, in Supp. of Mot. in 
Opp. to Applee's Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) Such a motion invites trial courts to "amend its 
findings or make additional findings" of fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b); Utah R. App. P. 4(b). 
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However, such a motion submitted in response to the granting of summary judgment 
does not toll the time for an appeal. 
In Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme 
Court was confronted with whether appellant's Rule 52 motion effectively tolled the time 
to file a notice of appeal of summary judgment, id, at 322. Appellant argued that his 
motion, although unclear, was a Rule 52(b) motion which, under Rule 4(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, tolls the thirty-day time limit until the motion is resolved 
by the trial court. Id, The appellee, on the other hand argued that since the order 
appealed from was one for summary judgment, appellant's motion could not have been 
brought under 52(b) but instead was a Rule 52(a) motion requesting the court to set 
forth the basis for its award of summary judgment Id... The Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that "whether [appellant's] motion was couched in terms of Rule 52(a) or 
52(b) makes no significant difference in the resolution of the issue presented.' 
Neerings, 817 P.2d at 322. The court held that following a summary judgment award, 
neither a Rule 52(a) nor a 52(b) motion tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal JdL at 
322-23. Consequently, the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal, 
id , at 323 
This case is controlled by Neerings v. Utah State Bar. Plaintiffs now frame their 
April 10, 1995 objection as a Rule 52(b) motion However, even if it were a Rule 52(b) 
motion, seeking additional or amended findings of fact, it could have had no impact on 
the trial court's summary judgment since "findings of fact are unnecessary in connection 
with summary judgment decisions." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Thus, Plaintiffs' "motion" did not toll the time for filing their notice of 
appeal. Neerings, 817 P.2d at 322-323. 
In any event, the Plaintiffs' classification of their April 10, 1995 objection is pure 
revisionism. What the Plaintiffs filed was an objection to a proposed order pursuant to 
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Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration. Such an objection is not listed in 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as a type of filing that tolls the time 
for appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b).2 In fact, the Plaintiffs' objection could not even 
be considered a motion since, under Rule 7(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
it is not "[a]n application to the court for an order" See United States v. Conservation 
Chem. Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 227 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (stating that an objection, rather than 
an application for relief or other order, does not constitute a motion within the meaning, 
of Rule 7(b)(1)). 
This Court has ruled that the type of objection at issue is effectively overruled 
when the trial court signs and enters the proposed order, in Morgan v. Morgan, 875 
P.2d 563 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994), this Court ruled that 
despite the existence of objections to a proposed order that were not expressly 
addressed, the signing ot the order became the final order to appeal. "The objections 
were before the trial court; therefore, we believe the court implicitly denied plaintiffs 
objections." \jL at 564-65 n. 1; see also Zions First Nat'l Bank v. C'Est Bon Venture, 
613 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1980) (holding that an oral motion was effectively denied by a 
later judgment despite the fact that after the judgment, the trial court reconsidered the 
motion). 
In this case, by signing the proposed order after the Plaintiffs' objection was filed, 
the trial court effectively and implicitly overruled their objection. Plaintiffs' objection was 
filed four days before the entry of the trial court's final order, and Defendants' notice of 
submission again alerted the trial court to both the existence and substance of Plaintiffs' 
objection. Consequently, the time for filing an appeal commenced running at the time 
2
 Rule 4(b) provides 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by 
any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make 
additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be 
required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or 
(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the 
entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motions. 
the order was entered, April 14, 1995. The Plaintiffs' September 27, 1995 notice is 
therefore untimely, and this Court lacks jurisdicticn to consider Plaintiffs appeal. 
B. THIS COURT MUST AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF 
PLAINTIFFS5 DAMAGE CLAIMS BECAUSE SUCH CLAIMS WERE 
PROHIBITED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN A RULING THAT HAS GONE 
UNCHALLENGED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND, IN ANY EVENT, IS 
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE BASES. " 
Under the doctrine of "law of the case," a trial court ruling from which no appeal 
has been taken cannot be challenged and must be appiied by the appellate court. 
"Failure to perfect an appeal goes to the jurisdiction of this Court. Where the denial of a 
motion ..... or any other final ruling or order of the trial court, goes unchallenged by 
appeal, such becomes the law of the case, and is not thereafter subject to later 
challenge." Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., 6 «9 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1930) (footnote 
omitted). 
In this case, Plaintiffs failed to appeal from the trial court's order that was 
explained at the January 30, 1995 hearing and signed and entered on February 10, 
1995. That order forbade Plaintiffs from amending their Amended Complaint by adding 
damage claims against Defendants within ninety days of their December 19, 1994 
Notice of Claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14. This meant that no damage claims 
could be filed until March 19, 1995. Although Plaintiffs violated this order by purporting 
to assert such claims on February 13, 1995, they never challenged the order. 
Therefore, under the doctrine of law of the case, this Court must apply the trial court's 
ruling of January 30 and February 10, 1995, to affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs' damage 
claims. 
Even if Plaintiffs could challenge the trial court's ruling prohibiting the assertion of 
damages claims, Plaintiffs would have to overcome a heavy burden. This ruling was 
made on Plaintiffs' motion to amend their Amended Complaint. Such rulings can only 
be reversed by showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Kleinert v. Kimball 
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Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Mountain America Credit 
Union v McClellan. 854 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1356 
(Utah 1993). Thus, the trial court's ruling must be upheld if any reasonable basis exists 
to support it. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, reasonable bases exist to support the trial court's ruling. First, as 
the trial court stated, Plaintiffs' damage claims were not ripe. Under Section 63-30-14 
of the Utah Code, claimants may not file a claim against a governmental entity until 
ninety days have passed since they served a notice of claim. In this case, ninety days 
had not elapsed. Moreover, Plaintiffs admitted that their claims were not ripe. Plaintiffs' 
counsel agreed that "the 90 days [had] not expired." (R at 842, 895.) Thus, it can 
hardly be said that no reasonable basis existed to support the partial denial of Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend. 
C THE TRIAL COURT S DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIMS RELATING TO THE 
VACATION ORDINANCE MUST BE AFFIRMED ON THE GROUND THAT 
PLAINTIFFS OPENLY WAIVED THOSE CLAIMS AND PLAINTIFFS SHOULD 
NOT BE ALLOWED TO GAIN FROM JUDICIAL ACTION THEY INVITEE/ ~ 
The Plaintiffs affirmatively waived their declarative, injunctive, and damage 
claims relating to the vacation ordinance when their attorney stated to the trial court and 
opposing counsel that Plaintiffs were no longer pursuing those claims. In addition, 
Plaintiffs should not be allowed to appeal the trial court's dismissal of such claims, 
assuming such dismissal was error, when the Plaintiffs invited such error by leading the 
court and counsel to believe that such claims were waived. 
Waiver is "'the intentional relinquishment of a known right.'" Soter's. Inc. v. 
Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993) (quoting Rees v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991)). Waiver requires (1) an 
existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention 
to relinquish the right, | d at 940. Civil litigants are bound by the statements and 
conduct of their attorneys. Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32(2); In re Caraill. Inc.. 66 F.3d 
17 
1256, 1261 (1st Cir. 1995); Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984); 
Walker v.Carlson. 740 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Plaintiffs do not dispute 
the satisfaction of the first two elements of waiver. Plaintiffs apparently believe they 
have a right to bring claims against Defendants relating to the vacation ordinance and 
have known of such a right since they filed their Verified Complaint on June 20, 1994. 
In addition, it can hardly be denied that Plaintiffs manifested an intention to 
relinquish a right to maintain claims regarding the vacation ordinance. At the January 
30, 1995 hearing on whether Plaintiffs should be allowed to file a Second Amended 
Complaint, Plaintiffs' counsel stated: 
The reason we are here before you today; your Honor, is not 
to attack the ordinance While the original complaint may 
have those allegations in it. your Honor, it is a mess out 
there. And what we are here today is [sic] asking the county 
to enforce its own ordinance. 
(R. at 840.) After Defendants' counsel stated, "As I see the second amended complaint 
they are going to be filing another version of i t . . . wherein, as ! understand it, they do 
not seek to invalidate the ordinance," the trial court responded, That's what was 
represented." (R. at 843.) Moreover, the trial court confirmed that "that issue is dead." 
(R. at 843.) At no time during this exchange did Plaintiffs' counsel object or otherwise 
alter the perception that Plaintiffs were waiving their claims relating to the vacation 
ordinance. 
This is also the reason why Plaintiffs' argument under Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is groundless. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court violated 
Rule 52(a) by not specifying the grounds upon which it based its award of summary 
judgment. However, Plaintiffs themselves supplied the sole basis for the trial court's 
dismissal of their vacation ordinance claims. At the January 30, 1995 hearing, Plaintiffs 
openly and affirmatively stated that they were no longer pursuing vacation ordinance 
claims. Thus, it is highly disingenuous for Plaintiffs to now argue that the trial court's 
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subsequent dismissal of those claims came as a surprise to Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs 
have no idea as to why the court so ruled. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling because Plaintiffs led the trial 
court to believe they were no longer pursuing vacation ordinance claims. It is a long-
standing principle that "a party who takes a position which either leads a court into error 
or by conduct approves the error committed by the court, cannot later take advantage 
of such error in procedure." Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Prods. Co., 137 P.2d 347, 
354 (Utah 1943); see also Butler, Crocket and Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline 
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 235 (Utah 1995); Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 
265, 270 (Utah 1995). 
In this case, Plaintiffs led the court into the alleged error and by ;:heir own 
conduct approved such error. First Plaintiffs, through counsel, declared in open court 
that they were no longer pursuing claims related to the vacation ordinance. Second, 
when the trial court confirmed that Plaintiffs were no longer challenging the ordinance 
and that "that issue is dead," (R. at 843), Plaintiffs approved the trial court's conclusion 
by remaining silent and failing to object. 
This Court should look askance upon Plaintiffs' strategy of leading the trial court 
and opposing parties to believe that Plaintiffs were no longer pursuing vacation 
ordinance claims. The trial court relied upon Plaintiffs' waiver by dismissing those 
claims with prejudice. Defendants relied upon Plaintiffs' waiver by not asserting points 
and authorities to support the vacation ordinance. 
In relying on Plaintiffs' relinquishment and abandonment of the vacation 
ordinance claims, Defendants lost opportunities to convince the trial court that the 
vacation ordinance not only complied with the Utah law, but also did not unduly restrict 
Plaintiffs' access to their properties. 
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This Court should view with even more dissatisfaction Plaintiffs' attempt to attack 
the vacation ordinance on appeal. Plaintiffs openly abandoned its vacation ordinance 
claims at the January 30, 1995 hearing. Defendants relied upon that abandonment by 
withholding their strong defenses of the vacation ordinance. Now, Plaintiffs, through 
duplicity, seek to bypass a trial court's review of their claims and argue the merits of 
those claims to this Court. Plaintiffs' strategy reflects a vexatious inclination to maintain 
their claims at all costs, no matter how groundless their claims happen to be. Not only 
should this Court affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' vacation ordinance claims 
because Plaintiffs invited and acquiesced to such dismissal, but this Court should also 
find that this appeal is frivolous and interposed solely to harass, cause needless 
increase in the cost of litigation, and delay the inevitable and irrevocable dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' vacation ordinance claims. 
D. THIS COURT MUST AFFIRM AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL COMMISSIONERS 
BECAUSE THEY ARE ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE FROM CLAIMS ARISING OUT 
OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS; 
Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution provides in part that "any speech or 
debate in either house . . . shall not be questioned in any other place.'' In interpreting 
nearly identical language in the United States Constitution,3 the United States Supreme 
Court has held that because the privilege of legislators to be free from arrest or civil 
process for what they do or say in legislative proceedings has taproots in the 
parliamentary struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and because 
freedom of speech and action in the legislature were "taken as a matter of course by 
those who severed the colonies from the crown and founded our nation," that the acts 
of state legislators are absolutely privileged notwithstanding an unworthy purpose. 
Tennev v. Brandehove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-73, 377 (1951). In Lake Country Estates v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979), the United States Supreme 
3
 Article I, § 6 of the United States Constitution provides that "any Speech or Debate in either House 
. . . shall not be questioned in any other Place." 
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Court extended this immunity to regional legislators who were held to be absolutely 
immune from actions arising out of legitimate legislative activity. idL at 405-06. The 
Court held the reasoning of Tennev applicable to federai, state, and regional legislators 
as a matter of federal constitutional law. jd. at 405; see Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373. 
The same absolute immunity has been extended by the United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeal to include county legislators. Since the Supreme Court's decision in 
Lake Country, each of the eleven federal circuits that have considered the question 
found its reasoning equally applicable to local legislators, such as county 
commissioners, and has granted them absolute immunity from suit. Fry v. Board of 
County Comm'rs of the County of Baca. 7 F.3d 936, 942 (10th Cir. 1993); Acevedo-
Cotdero v. Corclero-Santiago, 958 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Haskali v. 
Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1277 {6th Cir. 1988); Atchison v. RaffiariL708. 
F;2d 96. 98-100 (3rd Cir. 1983); Reed v. Shcrewood. 704 F.2d 943? 952-53 (7th Cir. 
1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meversbn. 690 F.2d 327, 829 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1039 (1983); Kuzinich v: County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349-
50 (9th Cir. 1982); Hernandez v. Lafayette. 643 F.2d 1138, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1981), 
cert, denied. 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Bruce v. Riddle. 631 F 2d 272, 274-80 (4th Cir. 
1980); Gorman Towers. Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611-14 (8th Cir. 1980)); 
Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill 973 F.2d 70, 72-73 (2nd Cir. 1992). Under the doctrine 
espoused by these courts, county legislators are immune from actions arising out of the 
legislative process at work."' Fry, 7 F.3d at 942. 
Under Utah's Speech and Debate Clause, this Court should adopt the absolute 
legislative immunity doctrine set forth by the United States Supreme Court and applied 
to county legislators by the eleven federal circuits. First, the Utah constitutional 
provision and the federal constitutional provision are near duplicates, indicating that the 
drafters of the Utah provision intended that it have the same impact as the federal one. 
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See State v.Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1996): State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 
1219, 1221 (Utah 1988); KUTV, Inc. v. Conder. 668 P.2d 513, 521 (Utah 1983); 
Untermever v. State Tax Comm'n, 102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 881, 885 (1942). 
Moreover, the reasoning adopted by the federal courts is equally applicable in 
Utah: 
"Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited 
discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private 
indulgence but for the public good. One must not expect 
uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would 
be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and 
inconvenience and distractions of a thai upon a conclusion 
of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them 
based upon a jury's speculation as to motives. . . . 
"Legislative committees have been charged with losing sight 
of their duty of disinterestedness, in times of political 
passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily 
attributed to legislative conduct and as readily believed. 
Courts are not the place for such controversies. Self-
discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reiiance for 
discouraging or correcting such abuses. The courts should 
not go beyond the narrow confines of determining that a 
committee's inquiry may fairly be deemed within Its 
province." 
Fry, 7 F.3d at 942 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377-78). 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has reiterated these same ideals. In 
Zions First Natl Bank v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 239, 390 P.2d 854 (1964), the court stated 
that the deposition of the Utah State Bank Commissioner should not have been taken 
because it is inappropriate for courts to "'probe the mental processes' of such an 
official.'" Id at 856 (quoting Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S 409 (1941)), see also 
Sears v. Ogden Citv. 572 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Utah 1977) ("The courts may not delve into 
the wisdom of a legislative act. . . ."). In addition, in a case with some resemblance to 
the present one, the Utah Supreme Court held that apart from arbitrary or abusive action 
"the propriety or necessity of vacating a street, are matters within the discretion of the 
municipal authorities which will not be inquired into by the courts" because "faithfulness 
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to the public trust reposed in the members of the legislative body will be presumed." 
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identical constitutional provision, the reasoning of the doctrine applies with equal force in 
and because the Utah Supreme Court has expressed the same sentiments that 
rlie the doctrine, this Court should adof- •* yib $ 
under Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution as adopted and applied by the 
federal 
This case is clearly one in which the absolute legislative ii i in i iiiii nt) :1 : cti ii « : 
should apply. The only claims at issue are ones relating to an ordinance Therefore, tlie 
'• ^olutely immune from Plaintiffs' vacation 
ordinance claims under the Utah Cor istitution. 
XI CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs failed to timely file a notice of appeal, arnil therefore this Court lacks 
siiLft 11 lii.illiM ii II i *" i ri iff in in i II n-ii Ikji Plaintiffs' ar-pe-il lh^ r iiiii must nffimi the • 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' damage claims because the trial court prohibited Plaintiffs from 
filing such claims in an earlier ruling that has gone unchallenged by Plaintiffs. The 
(fistiiryi.il' I I'liiiii lilC • I ni • fi'liiiiirifM i i i i i is l^iuijld h^ iiffiiin^il si i i> Plaintiffs, 
through their counsel, either openly and affirmatively relinquished those claims or 
improperly led the trial court to believe that they did. Finally, the trial court's ruling as to 
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absolutely immune from such claims since they arise out of clear legislative functions. 
The trial court's summary judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED: February 14, 1997. 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, 
J. BLAINE JOHNSON, EVA C. 
JOHNSON, AND DIANE PEARL 
MEIBOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY AND COMMISSIONER 
E. JAMES BRADLEY, COMMISSIONER 
RANDY HORIUCHI and 
COMMISSIONER BRENT OVERSON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
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1 lawsuit as to damages? 
2 MR. M. OLSEN: Well, like I said, your Honor, as 
3 I see it, it is all part of the same lawsuit. Originally, 
4 we thought it was going to be injunctive relief, however, 
5 I'm telling you now that, yes, we did file a complaint on 
6 or about December 12. 
7 THE COURT: So it hasn't spent — the 90 days has 
8 not expired? 
9 MR. M. OLSEN: I guess not — 
10 THE COURT: All right. 
11 MR. M. OLSEN: — as to that. 
12 THE COURT: I understand. Thank you. 
13 I'm going to allow you to amend if you so choose, 
14 and it will be subject to all motions to dismiss and 
15 everything else that Mr. Colessides wishes to file. But 
16 it will only be as to the injunctive relief — I guess not 
17 injunctive — I guess it is injunctive relief you're asking 
18 me on one hand part of that where a suit to force the 
19 county to do something, i.e. enforce their own ordinances, 
20 right? 
21 MR. M. OLSEN: Right. 
22 THE COURT: But I am also making the distinction 
23 between that and asking for damages. I think the damages 
24 issues are well taken by Mr. Colessides. You will not be 
25 able to amend until that 90 days expires pending whatever 
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1 the county wishes 
2 MR. M OLSEN; No problem. 
3 THE COU RT: ft t tin at time you very well may be 
4 back I n front of me baser :I upon a mo tion to .amend tidied 
5 upon that 90 daj s B ut any amendment you make will be 
.6 subject t. ::> a ny motions Mr Colessides, i n terms of 
7 dismissal, lack: of jurisdiction or any other matters. 
8 MR. COLESSIDES: Your Hono. i :# clarification for 
9 just on e moment. 
10 THE COURT 2 es . 
11 MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, as we have viewed 
12 these t:h I s i s sort - we are deal ing wi th a moving 
13 target. As I sc= € • the second amended complaint they are 
14 going to be filing another version,, of it and wherein, as 1 
15 understand :I t.(l they do not seek to invalidate the 
16 ordinance, am I correct? 
17 THE COURT: That's what, was represented. 
18 MR. COLESSIDES: And that „ i ssue i s dead. 
19 THE -ve tol i them they would 
20 amend to not mcjude damages and so only as to the 
21 Injunctive relief «:is to have the con inty enforce •• . own 
22 ordinance! 'k i I I I " t l i, = ] i lit 1 ta„ ti on • , / ^  u s . 
23 MR. OLSEN: And, your Honor, . It will help 
24 counsel, and help yon, it would be that v-* is* !**- - : ing, 
2 5 a l In i < i. ' U t i , in I - u 
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IN 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, 
J. BLAINE JOHNSON, EVA C. 
JOHNSON, AND DIANE PEARL 
MEIBOS, 
ClIIIRT 
lOUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAK; 
COUNTY AND COMMISSIONER 
E. JAMES BRADLEY, COMMIf--.' 
RANDY HORIUCHI and 
COMMISSIONER BRENT 
individually, 
Def< 
CASE NO. 940903951 AA 
* * * * * 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
(Defendant's motion for summary judgment) 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
MARCH 29, 1995 
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1 capricious. 
2 It is to be noted that the court must assume — 
3 presume that the land use decision regulations are valid 
4 and that it can only determine whether or not the 
5 decisions is arbitrary, capricious and illegal. And I say 
6 to the court in fact, they did not do that. They could 
7 not do that because they have not presented any evidence 
8 before this court on my motion to dismiss, your Honor. 
9 Now, as to the other problems, your Honor, they 
10 have failed — obviously they have failed to have their 
11 burden of proof show they're properly — and I think that 
12 as to the remaining issues, our brief as to the 
13 governmental immunity, the Noble case — Debry v. Noble 
14 case, which I think it is a seminal case in this 
15 particular matter in terms of immunity — all those things 
16 adequately covers, your Honor, the rest of our motion. 
17 Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Colessides. 
19 Mr. Olsen? 
20 MR. OLSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 May it please the court, counsel: I think we 
22 need to back up and I will sort of try and take this, your 
23 Honor, as Mr. Colessides has addressed each of these. 
24 Your Honor, when we were here on January 30th 
25 and — I know the court is going to rule as it's going to 
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1 i: til e„ I 111in1 - vyiti it 1 Winn Id ~. e n t i r e 
2 t r a n s c r i p t 1 Hunk iL yuu < , > . h i s 
3 transcript - by the th ings * < ,- * 
4 acknowl i?rlypii I llvit MI IHUMI I ipi *amages n I HM 
5 amended compla in t . Xou t o l d me. e ^i you 
6 t o l d me yes , subject to Mr Colessides — subject t o any 
7 •• |. Mi I "f) 1  P S S i r i f - , i in I H I iiiir 11 I i] I s i n i s s a Il Jl ac : !«< > f 
8 jurisdiction, and any other matters - w e acknowledged 
9 that perhaps some of our claims were not ripe at that 
10 g noti ce to the 
11 county ' lamages ... «,» '-•aci perceived we had incurred. 
12 Furthermore, your Honor, once I take a look at 
13 1:1 i„e en I:: 1 re t n an scri j: I: i i I • ::::::::<:::::)i itext i t: w a s i i =i .i e r e v 
14 plaintiffs'1 intention to waive any right that they may 
15 have to challenge this ordinance. Let me just explain, a 
1 6 J i t:t: ] e 1: i I: cii n I gi € • tl le r : n i ] : t some i n formation 
17 At that hearing I think we did acknowledge that 
18 we were i n some trouble,, that buildings had been built. 
19 There was Jil i t: I::.] e w e • • ::: :: in Il I i:i :: • t: ::  g =s lit: N ::  r t l l 3E: ' or t: Un 1 oi l back, 
20 because we could not challenge that ordinance.. However, 
21 if you wi ] 1 see in that ordinance, the portion that fronts 
22 m} c] i ents ' proper t:;y ,. j £ ] ? roi :i review the ordinances , that 
23 store is - - right now is 33 fee t: w :ii I 'They took eight 
24 feet of tha t, also vacated that So as a matter of law, 
25 pursuant to Mason v. state and the Provo City case, we are 
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1 no showing to my satisfaction in anything addition to what 
2 I previously ruled on. I further find that the provisions 
3 as to 17-27-1001, in addition to the county ordinance, has 
4 not been complied with. 
5 What I'm going to do, I'm going to dismiss this 
6 matter without prejudice — without prejudice, that is 
7 emphasized — allowing you to exhaust whatever means you 
8 wish to, your administrative remedies, and then have 
9 leave, if after that time there has been no resolution to 
10 your satisfaction, through the — through Mr. Jones, 
11 through the board of planning — the Planning Commission, 
12 through the Board of County Commissioners and the Board of 
13 Adjustment, then you do have leave, without prejudice, to 
14 refile the matter. 
15 I also take — and I would ask that you receive a 
16 copy of the transcript in this matter, Mr. Olsen, for 
17 those positions taken by Mr. Colessides, in that you are 
18 not going to be prejudiced by any waiver of time. 
19 It is my indication from listening to you, 
20 Mr. Colessides, that you're maintaining that it is a 
21 continuing problem and that there will be no waiver of 
22 time, and your position taken before me today, and I 
23 expect that no contrary position be taken in further 
24 litigation — 
25 MR. COLESSIDES: That's correct with the 
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1 exception of the vacation ordinance. 
2 THE COURT: And the vacation ordinance is subject 
3 to a previous order that I made. 
4 MR. COLESSIDES: Right. As it relates, your 
5 Honor, to enforcement of 1186 and to the conditional use 
6 permit, I respectfully submit to the court that so long as 
7 there is a continuous development, that is a continuous 
8 enforcement problem, and therefore, there is not — in 
9 that sense there is no time limitations. 
10 THE COURT: The reason why I state that, 
11 Mr. Olsen, the court is relying somewhat upon 
12 Mr. Colessides's position in that matter in rendering the 
13 decision, which in my opinion would minimize whatever 
14 prejudice, if any, would be to the plaintiffs in this 
15 matter. 
16 All I'm asking you to start again, go through the 
17 procedures. If at that time you're at the same posture as 
18 you are now, you will have leave to refile. It will 
19 not — it may or may not come to me. I don't know what 
20 the computer will spit out. But that would be my ruling 
21 as to the — this would be the judgment on the pleadings 
22 based upon the responses and the allegations, and it will 
23 be dismissed without prejudice to follow those procedures 
24 as I have indicated. 
25 Mr. Colessides, could you draft up the 
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NICK J COLESSIDES (# 696) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
Attorney for defendants 
v&ED DISTRICT COURT 
APR 1 4 1995 
DepuyCfeiK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, 
J. BLAINE JOHNSON, 
EVA C. JOHNSON, and 
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, and 
COMMISSIONER E. JAMES 
BRADLEY, COMMISSIONER 
RANDY HORIUCHI and 
COMMISSIONER BRENT 
OVERSON, individually, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No.: 94 09 03951 
Judge: Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings or 
in the alternative motion for summary judgment having come 
regularly for hearing, pursuant to notice, on the 29th day of 
March, 1995, before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, Judge, 
presiding, plaintiffs being represented by Martin N. Olsen, 
their attorney of record, and defendants being represented by 
G$$€4'? 
Nick J, Colessides, their attorney of record, and the Court 
having reviewed the various motions, memoranda, and 
accompanying affidavits submitted in behalf of all parties, 
and the Court having heard argument by both counsel on behalf 
of all parties, and the matter having been submitted to the 
Court for a decision, and good cause otherwise appearing 
therefor, now upon motion of Nick J. Colessides attorney for 
defendants, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED that 
plaintiffs7 claims as contained within plaintiffs' second 
amended complaint, relating to that certain Salt Lake County 
Ordinance as passed by the Board of Salt Lake County 
Commissioners, to-wit, ordinance number 1275 (corrected), 
dated August 10, 1995, and recorded August 12, 1995, in the 
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, be and the 
same are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and 
FURTHER, ORDERED that plaintiffs' all other claims 
as asserted against defendants in plaintiffs' second amended 
complaint, be dismissed without prejudice; and 
FURTHER, ORDERED that plaintiffs' second amended 
complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed without 
prejudi=e. fc , 
Dated this / 7 day of //v/U C
 t 1995. 
2 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE: 
MARTIN N. OLSEN 
Attorney for plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Served a copy of the foregoing to: 
MR MARTIN OLSEN ESQ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
8138 SOUTH STATE STREET 
MIDVALE UTAH 84047 
MR KENT LEWIS ESQ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2001 SOUTH STATE STREET # S 3600 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84190-1200 
by mailing the same, first class mail,postage prepaid, this 
/3rr day of April, 1995. ^N 
h\ha\cutberts.155 
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RBCaVK ' -liXERK 
toKJ6l&fa 
DIANE PEAKKMEBOS 
Plaintiff—prose 
3278 Marjon Circle 
Sandy, UT 84092-4212 
Telephone: 942-3036 ^ lOvvi'l^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, J. BLAINE 
JOHNSON, EVA C. JOHNSON, and 
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
and COMMISSIONER E. JAMES BRADLEY, 
COMMISSIONER RANDY HORIUCHI, and 
COMMISSIONER BRENT OVERSON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 940903951 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs/Appellants above-named hereby 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the order of the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki entered 
in this matter on April 14, 1995. The appeal if taken from such part of the order stating 
that: 
"... plaintiffs' claims as contained within plaintiffs' second amended 
000706 
complaint, relating to that certain Salt Lake Coimty Ordinance as passed by 
the Board of Salt Lake County Commissioners, to-wit, ordinance number 
1275 (corrected), dated August 10, 1995, and recorded August 12, 1995, in 
the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's office, be and the same are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice..." 
DATED this Zl7~ day of September, 1995. 
Alayna ^ / tul^tson — Plaintiff 
/&>yw- *£ - ^pJl^yut^y^-
Eva C. Johnson — Plaintiff 
Ui^y*+-
J. Blaine Johnson — Plaintiff 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 27th of September, 1995, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to: 
Nick J. Colessides, Esq. 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3325 
Kent Lewis, Esq. 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State Street, No. S-3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
l^flUV) 
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NOTICE OF CLAIM 
COME NOW, ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, J. BLAINE JOHNSON, EVA 
C. JOHNSON and DIANE PEARL MEIBOS, by and through their 
attorney Martin N. Olsen and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 63-30-11 (1993) hereby provide notice for claim of 
injury to Salt Lake County, which injury resulted from Salt 
Lake County's failure to enforce ordinance No. 1275 entered 
August 10, 1994. 
I. BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
On AugXist 10, 1994, Salt Lake County, through its Board 
of Commissioners, to wit: Commissioner E. James Bradley, 
Commissioner Randy Horiuchi, and Commissioner Brent Overson 
passed Ordinance No. 1275 which provided in part: 
3. That the segment of North Union 
Avenue described in paragraph 2 is being closed 
rather than vacated in order that Salt Lake 
County may convey an access easement over said 
property to Hermes Associates Ltd., the 
adjacent property owner to the north, and to 
the owners of lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 20, 21, and 
22, Fort Union Plat, the adjacent property 
owners on the south ("south property owners"), 
-which will allow better access to their 
respective properties than by having the 
property revert as a matter of law, half to 
each by vacation; that the south property 
owners will still have direct access to 7250 
South and will be provided additional access to 
the north side of the properties from 7240 
South through a 25 foot wide public right-of-
way which will be conveyed by Hermes Associates 
Ltd. to Salt Lake County. The 25 foot public 
EttllglT JL 
A A A /? A fk 
rightrof-way will revert to Hermes Associates, 
Inc. in the event it acquires the south 
properties. 
Salt Lake County has failed to enforce the above 
provision; specifically, despite several notices, Salt Lake 
County has allowed the developer, Fort Union Associates, to 
build into the twenty-five foot public right of way. Thus, 
the above named parties have been denied reasonable access and 
county services. 
II. NATURE OF CLAIM ASSERTED. 
As a result of the County's failure to enforce 
Ordinance No. 127 5 enacted August 10, 1994, the above named 
parties have sustained injury as they have been denied 
reasonable access to their property and have also been denied 
county services. 
III. DAMAGES INCURRED. 
Inasmuch as damages cannot be ascertained at this time, 
notice of the same will be provided at such time that such 
becomes available. ^—•%. s ^ 
MARTIN' N.IOLSEN ' 
Attorney ^or Claimants 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the J^+K. day of December, 1994, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CLAIM, 
postage prepaid thereon, to: 
Kent Lewis, Esq. 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State Street, S-3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Nick J. Colessides, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303 
v / C ( fr/vv?v^o|^ > 
0 0 0 4 9 5 
TabF 
320 Utah 817 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
R. Owen NEERINGS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH STATE BAR and Sydnie Kuhre, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Nos. 890088, 890239, 890425 and 890509. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 2, 1991. 
Bar examinee brought action against 
state bar and its employee for revealing 
failing score to examinee's co-worker be-
fore officially informing him. The District 
Court, Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya, 
J., granted summary judgment for bar and 
employee. Examinee appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Hall, C.J., held that trial 
court's failure to issue written statement of 
grounds for granting summary judgment 
was not violation of rules requiring court 
to state grounds for decision and to make 
amendments to findings, and therefore rule 
allowing tolling of time to appeal when 
motion to amend findings is filed was not 
applicable, and appeal was dismissed. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Howe, Associate C.J., filed dissenting 
opinion. 
Appeal and Error <£=»344 
Judgment <s=>186 
By stating that it agreed with argu-
ment and citation of authorities stated in 
each of defendant's points in its summary 
judgment motion, trial court substantially 
complied with rule requiring trial court to 
state grounds for its decision on summary 
judgment when motion is based on more 
than one ground; therefore, plaintiffs mo-
tion for additional findings was not a mo-
tion under rule providing that upon motion 
of party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings, and 
filing of motion did not toll time for appeal. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a, b); Sup.Ct 
Rules, Rule 4(b) (Repealed). 
Brian M. Barnard, John Pace, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Carman E. Kipp, Robert H. Rees, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants and appellees. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff R. Owen Neerings sought to 
recover damages caused by the unautho-
rized publication of private information. 
Neerings appeals from the entry of sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendants the 
Utah State Bar and Sydnie Kuhre ("the 
Bar'*). We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
When reviewing an order granting sum-
mary judgment, the facts and all reason-
able inferences that can be drawn from the 
facts are to be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the mo-
tion.1 
Neerings, as part of his application for 
membership in the Bar, sat for the Febru-
ary 1988 written examination. It is neces-
sary to successfully complete the bar ex-
amination in order to be admitted to the 
Bar, a prerequisite to engage in the prac-
tice of law in the state of Utah. Prior to 
the time the official results of the examina-
tion were released, Kuhre, an employee of 
the Bar, informed Fasselin, a co-worker of 
Neerings, that Neerings had failed the ex-
amination. Fasselin then informed other 
co-workers of the results of the examina-
tion. Neerings was officially informed that 
he did not pass the examination on March 
25, 1988. 
Neerings appealed the result of his bar 
examination to the Utah State Bar Commis-
sion. Again, prior to the time Neerings 
was officially informed of the disposition of 
his appeal, Kuhre informed Fasselin that 
Neerings' appeal was unsuccessful Neer-
ings was officially informed that his appeal 
was unsuccessful on May 27, 1988. Al-
though the Bar has enacted no rules con-
cerning the confidentiality of examination 
results, there is a "long-standing practice 
and unwritten but strictly-enforced policy" 
1. Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall 795 P.2d 650, 651 (Utah 1990). 
NEERINGS v. UTAH STATE BAR 
Cite as 817 ?2d 320 (Utah 1991) 
that the names of those applicants who do of Civil Procedure 
not pass the examination should not be 
released. However, the names of appli-
cants who pass the examination are pub-
lished. 
Utah 321 
On June 9, 1988, Neerings initiated this 
action, claiming that by publicizing the re-
sults of his bar examination, the Bar (1) 
violated the Utah Archives and Records 
Service and Information Practice Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 to -89, (2) violated 
Neerings' constitutional right to privacy, 
(3) negligently breached a duty of confiden-
tiality established by the Bar's internal pol-
icies, and (4) tortiously invaded Neerings' 
common law right to privacy. The Bar 
moved for summary judgment pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and on 
January 12, 1989, the district court, by an 
initialed minute entry, entered summary 
judgment dismissing all of Neerings' 
claims. 
After this minute entry, a number of 
motions, minute entries, orders, and notices 
of appeal followed. On January 20, 1989, 
Neerings filed a motion entitled "Mo-
tion/Request for Findings," requesting 
that since defendants' motion was based on 
more than one ground, the court issue a 
brief written statement of the grounds for 
its decision. In this motion, Neerings cited 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)2 and 
quoted language from it. However, in the 
motion, a request was made for the entry 
of "findings of fact," which, Neerings now 
argues, is a request appropriately made 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b).3 
On February 1, 1989, Neerings filed a mo-
tion entitled "Motion For New Trial and To 
Amend Judgment" pursuant to Utah Rule 
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts specifically and 
state separately its conclusions of law there-
on Findings of fact, whether based on 
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous The trial 
court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in ruling on motions, ex-
cept as provided for in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement 
of the grounds for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, 
59 wherein he again 
requested that the court issue a brief writ-
ten statement of the grounds for its deci-
sion. On February 6, 1989, the court en-
tered an order granting summary judg-
ment in favor of the Bar without acting on 
Neerings' rule 52(a) and rule 59 motions. 
On February 15, 1989, the trial judge en-
tered an initialed minute entry denying 
Neerings' rule 52(a) motion, stating that 
"specific findings of fact are not required 
under the rules for the entry of summary 
judgment." The trial judge also stated 
that he agreed with the argument and cita-
tion of authorities stated in each of the 
Bar's points in its motion for summary 
judgment. On February 23, 1989, the 
court entered an initialed minute entry de-
nying Neerings' rule 59 motion. 
On March 9, 1989, thirty-one days after 
the February order granting the Bar's mo-
tion for summary judgment, Neerings filed 
a notice of appeal. On March 15, 1989, the 
trial court entered an order denying Neer-
ings' motion for a new trial or to amend the 
judgment. On May 15, 1989, the Bar filed 
a motion to dismiss the appeal, in the su-
preme court, on the ground that the notice 
of appeal was granted prior to the time the 
trial court acted on Neerings' rule 59 mo-
tion. Neerings then sent a letter to the 
trial judge stating that there was only a 
minute entry denying the January 20 mo-
tion entitled "Motion/Request for Find-
ings." Neerings prepared an order which 
characterized the January 20 motion as a 
motion to enter findings under rule 52(b) 
and enclosed it in the letter. This order 
was signed and entered on May 24, 1989. 
On June 6, 1989, Neerings filed a second 
and 59 when the motion is based on more 
than one ground. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a) (emphasis added). 
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of party 
made not later than the 10 days after the 
entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may 
amend the judgment accordingly. The mo-
tion may be made with a motion for new trial 
pursuant to Rule 59. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(b) (emphasis added). 
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notice of appeal from the February 6, 1989 
order granting summary judgment. Neer-
ings claimed that the time for appeal was 
extended pursuant to rule 4(b) of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court4 by his Janu-
ary 20, 1989 motion, which Neerings char-
acterized as a rule 52(b) motion. The Bar 
filed a second motion in the supreme court, 
claiming that the second appeal was not 
timely. The Bar argued that Neerings' 
January 20, 1989 motion was not a rule 
52(b) motion but a rule 52(a) motion, which 
does not extend the time for filing a notice 
of appeal. Neerings responded by moving 
to consolidate the two appeals. On August 
7, 1989, this court entered a minute entry 
consolidating the cases and denying defen-
dants' motion to dismiss, but reserving the 
Bar's motion for plenary presentation and 
consideration. 
On August 25, 1989, the trial court en-
tered an order vacating its May 24 order, 
denying Neerings' January 20 "Motion/Re-
quest for Findings," and characterizing the 
January 20 motion as a rule 52(b) motion. 
On September 27, 1989, Neerings filed a 
third notice of appeal. On November 1, 
1989, the trial court entered an order vacat-
ing its August 25, 1989 order, denying 
Neerings' January 20 "Motion/Request for 
Findings," and characterizing the January 
20 motion as a rule 52(a) motion. On No-
vember 16, Neerings filed his fourth notice 
of appeal. On January 23, 1991, the latter 
two appeals were consolidated with the 
first two appeals and the issue of whether 
Neerings had timely filed a notice of appeal 
was again reserved for plenary presenta-
tion. 
A number of substantive issues are 
presented in this appeal, including whether 
4. Rule of the Utah Supreme Court 4(b) provides 
in pertinent part: 
(b) Motions post judgment or orders. If a 
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is filed in the trial court by a party 
. . . (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make 
additional findings of fact, whether or not an 
alteration of the judgment would be required 
if the motion is granted . . . or (4) under Rule 
59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order 
denying a new trial or granting or denying 
any other such motion A notice of ap-
 the Bar is a state agency within the con-
 templation of the Archives and Records 
3 Services and Information Practices Act, 
3 Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 to -89 (1989), 
 and the Public and Private Writings Act, 
 Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-26-1 to -8 (1987). 
However, this issue has heretofore been 
resolved by our decision in Barnard v. 
Utah State Bar} In any event, the dispos-
itive issue presented is whether Neerings 
> filed a timely notice of appeal. In their 
I briefs, both parties maintain that disposi-
> tive of the issue of the timely filing of the 
j notice of appeal is whether the January 20, 
1989 motion was a rule 52(b) motion, which 
r tolls the time for appeal, or a rule 52(a) 
motion, which does not toll the time for 
j appeal. 
' While rule 52(a) requires the trial court 
to state the grounds for its decision on 
summary judgment where the motion 
, therefor is based on more than one ground, 
no mechanism is contained therein to en-
\ force compliance. Likewise, rule 52(b) con-
tains no such enforcement provision, its 
L only purpose being to permit the filing of 
motions for amendment or the making of 
additional findings of fact, which, pursuant 
to rule 52(a), are not required in ruling 
upon motions for summary judgment We 
therefore conclude that whether Neerings' 
motion was couched in terms of rule 52(a) 
or 52(b) makes no significant difference in 
the resolution of the issue presented. 
Neerings cites and relies upon Alford v. 
Utah League of Cities and Toums* as 
authority for the proposition that rule 52(b) 
affords a mechanism to challenge the fail-
ure of the trial court to state the grounds 
for granting summary judgment How-
ever, the Alford court declined to address 
peal must be filed within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order of the 
district court disposing of the motion as pro-
vided above. 
5. 804 P.2d 526 (Utah 1991). There we conclud-
ed that the Bar is not a state agency within the 
meaning of the applicable acts. Id. at 529-30. 
This ruling apparently prompted plaintiff to 
forego the presentation of oral argument on this 
appeal. 
6. 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct.App.1990). 
AJ. MACKAY CO. v. 
Cite as 817 ?2d 
the issue on its merits for the reason that it 
had not been raised at trial and was 
presented for the first time on appeal.7 
Inasmuch as summary judgment is only 
appropriate when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact, and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law,8 
the inclusion of the requirement in rule 
52(a) that the court shall issue a statement 
of the ground for its decision cannot bear 
upon the undisputed factual basis for the 
decision. Hence, it can only bear upon 
alternative theories of law that may apply 
to the facts. 
While it may be instructive for the trial 
court to inform the litigants of the legal 
basis for its decision, we are not persuaded 
that failure to do so constitutes reversible 
error. In any event, in the instant case, it 
appears that the trial court substantially 
complied with rule 52(a) by stating that it 
agreed with the argument and citation of 
authorities stated in each of the Bar's 
points in its motion for summary judgment. 
A more important reason for inclusion of 
the requirement that the trial court state 
the ground for its decision^ in summary 
judgment cases is administrative in nature 
in that it would provide a ready basis for 
review on appeal. However, also from the 
administrative point of view, failure to 
state the grounds for its decision would not 
constitute reversible error. Rather, in an 
appropriate case, failure to do so may only 
justify remand to the trial court 
We therefore conclude that the notice of 
appeal was not timely filed. We are hence 
without jurisdiction, and the appeal is dis-
missed. 
STEWART, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
(dissenting): 
I dissent. I would not dismiss the ap-
peal. Neerings' motion filed on January 20 
was entitled "Motion/Request for Find-
ings/' In the body, plaintiff moved the 
court "to enter Findings of Fact" in the 
OKLAND CONST. CO- Utah 323 
323 (Utah 1991) 
above matter. Despite whatever else may 
have been in the motion, I am satisfied that 
it requested relief under rule 52(b) and the 
time for appeal was tolled until the trial 
court ruled on the motion. 
( o § KfY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
AJ. MACKAY COMPANY, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
• • 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 890172. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 16, 1991. 
Subcontractor brought action against 
general contractor to enforce arbitration 
clause, and contractor counterclaimed for 
damages. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., granted 
summary judgment to general contractor 
on arbitration issue, and appeal was taken. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that order was not final, appealable order. 
Appeal dismissed. 
1. Arbitration <s=>23.20 
Order finding that subcontractor was 
barred from enforcing arbitration rights 
under contract due to lack of valid contrac-
tor's license at time work was performed 
was not final, appealable order in that gen-
eral contractor's counterclaim against sub-
contractor remained pending. Rules App. 
Proc, Rule 3. 
2. Courts e=*23, 37(2), 39 
Acquiescence of parties is insufficient 
to confer jurisdiction on court; lack of jur-
7. See Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd of Educ, 797 8. Utah RXiv.P. 56(c). 
P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). 
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Cite as 875 P.2d 563 (UtahApp. 1994) 
property, even though parties were awarded 
undivided one-half interest in property in 
divorce decree, given that husband had sub-
sequently quit-claimed his interest in proper-
ties to former wife and parties had been 
divorced approximately seven years before 
husband purchased property from foreclosing 
entity. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 11, 1994. 
Quiet title action was commenced for 
vacation property which former husband pur-
chased from foreclosing entity following expi-
ration of former wife's redemption period 
and former wife asserted counterclaim. 
Husband's motion for summary judgment 
was granted by the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, J. Former 
wife appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, 
J., held that: (1) no cotenancy or fiduciary 
duty arose from husband's purchase of vaca-
tion property; (2) former wife, as judgment 
debtor, lacked interest in property to chal-
lenge sale to former husband; ,(£) validity of 
foreclosure proceeding could not be collater-
ally attacked; and (4) former wife was not 
entitled to lien on vacation property for child 
support arrearages and other unpaid obli-
gations. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgment <5>181(2) 
Summary judgment may be granted 
only where there is no genuine issue of mate-
rial fact and moving party is entitled to 
judgment as matter of law. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 56(c). 
2. Appeal and Error ®=>842(1) 
On appeal from summary judgment, ap-
pellate court resolves only legal issues and, 
thus, does not defer to trial court's ruling. 
Rules CivJProc, Rule 56(c). 
3. Fraud <3>7 
No fiduciary relationship existed be-
tween former husband and wife which im-
posed fiduciary duty upon husband to pre-
serve wife's interest in' foreclosed vacation 
4. Tenancy in Common @=>3 
Former husband's purchase of vacation 
property from homeowners' association fol-
lowing foreclosure did not revive cotenancy 
relationship that existed during marriage 
and, thus, former husband owed no fiduciary 
duty to preserve former wife's interest in 
property. 
5. Execution <s=>244 
Former wife, as judgment debtor and 
former owner, lacked interest needed to chal-
lenge validity of sale of property following 
foreclosure and expiration of redemption pe-
riod to debtor's former husband. 
6. Execution <s=>246 
Judgment debtor could not collaterally 
* attack foreclosure proceeding by objecting to 
quiet title suit brought by debtor's former 
•husband who purchased property from fore-
closing entity. 
7. Process <s=»146 
Allegation that defendant could not re-
member being served with process is irrele-
vant, provided that service of process was 
valid. 
8- Divorce e=*311.5 
Former wife was not entitled to lien for 
child support arrearages and other unpaid 
expenses against vacation property which 
husband purchased from foreclosing entity 
after wife's redemption period had expired, 
given that arrearages and foreclosures oc-
curred after former husband had transferred 
interest in properties to former wife and 
while former wife was sole owner of proper-
ties. 
Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cum-
mings, Salt Lake City, for appellant 
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Mary C. Corporon, Salt Lake City, for 
appellee. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and DAVIS, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Defendant Barbara Morgan appeals the 
trial court's order granting summary judg-
ment to plaintiff Dale Morgan. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced in 
1979. The divorce decree awarded plaintiff 
and defendant each an undivided one-half 
interest in the residence in Salt Lake County 
(residence) and in a lodge in Summit County 
(summer home). 
In 1984, plaintiff quit-claimed to defendant 
his interest in the residence and summer 
home to allegedly facilitate the sale of the 
properties. In 1986, plaintiff filed an action 
against defendant and others alleging that 
defendant had defrauded him into quit-claim-
ing to defendant his interest in the two prop-
erties. Plaintiffs action sought to quiet title 
in him to an undivided one-half interest in 
the residence and summer home. 
In a separate action in 1986, Pine Meadow 
Ranch Owners' Association (homeowners' as-
sociation) filed a suit against plaintiff in Sum-
mit County, alleging that he owed the home-
owners' association over $4,000 for assess-
ments on the summer home. Later that 
year, the homeowners' association amended 
its complaint, adding Barbara Morgan as a 
defendant because she held legal title to the 
summer home. She failed to respond to the 
amended complaint and default was entered 
against her for approximately $7,000. The 
homeowners' association obtained a writ of 
execution against the summer home. The 
county sheriff sold the summer home to the 
homeowners' association, subject to a six-
month redemption period. The deed was 
recorded after the redemption period had 
1. As a threshold matter, defendant argues that 
the summary judgment was not a final otder 
because her objections thereto were not express-
expired. Plaintiff subsequently purchased 
the summer home from the homeowners' as-
sociation. 
In 1988, defendant filed a counterclaim 
against plaintiff, alleging that plaintiff collu-
sively allowed the summer home to be fore-
closed upon and thereafter "redeemed" the 
property after it was sold at a sheriff's sale. 
Defendant also sought recovery for arrearag-
es allegedly owed under the divorce decree. 
Plaintiffs and defendant's causes of action 
were ultimately consolidated into the divorce 
action, presumably under the court's continu-
ing jurisdiction. 
In 1992, plaintiff filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment in the consolidated action, 
seeking to relinquish any claim he may have 
had in the residence and to quiet title in the 
summer home. The trial court issued a min-
ute entry granting plaintiffs motion for sum-
mary judgment, dismissing both parties' 
claims and adjudging plaintiff the sole owner 
of the summer home. Defendant filed objec-
tions to plaintiffs proposed order, to which 
plaintiff filed a response. Although the trial 
court did not expressly rule on defendant's 
objections, it did sign plaintiffs proposed or-
der granting summary judgment for plaintiff. 
ISSUES 
Defendant raises the following issues on 
appeal: (1) whether plaintiff and defendant 
were cotenants in the summer home, thereby 
creating a fiduciary duty to deal non-adverse-
ly with each other concerning the summer 
home; (2) whether the trial court properly 
dismissed defendant's claim that plaintiff and 
the homeowners' association were in collusion 
in conducting the sheriffs sale; (3) whether 
the Summit County action was valid as it 
relates to the consolidated action; and (4) 
whether the alleged arrearages on the resi-
dence and summer home relating to mort-
gage payments, property taxes, insurance, 
and repairs to the residence, as well as al-
leged child support arrearages, were subject 
to dismissal on plaintiffs motion for sum-
mary judgment.1 
Iy ruled upon. Defendant submitted timely ob-
jections to plaintiffs proposed order under Rule 
4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration, 
MORGAN v. iMORGAN 
Cite as 875 P.2d 563 (UtahApp. 1994) 
Utah 565 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] A summary judgment may be 
granted only where there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake 
Cvunty, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). On 
appeal from a summary judgment, we re-
solve only legal issues; therefore, we do not 
defer to the trial court's rulings. Ferree u 
State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). We 
may, however, "affirm a grant of summary 
judgment on any ground available to the trial 
court, even if it is one not relied on below/' 
Higgins, 855 F2d at 235 (citing Hill v. Se-
attle First NaVl Bank 827 P.2d 241, 246 
(Utah 1992)). 
ANALYSIS 
Cotenancy 
Defendant argues that she and plaintiff 
were cotenants to the summer home and that 
defendant therefore had 'a fiduciary duty to 
preserve her interest in the summer home. 
We disagree. 
[3,4] Plaintiff and defendant were not 
cotenants of the summer home at the com-
mencement, or during the pendency, of the 
Summit County action. The parties had 
been divorced approximately seven years pri-
or to the Summit County action. See, e.g., 
Glover v. Glover, 121 Utah 362, 366-67, 242 
P.2d 298, 300 (1952) (fiduciary relationship 
may exist between husband and wife before 
divorce decree is entered). Although the 
divorce decree awarded plaintiff and defen-
dant an undivided one-half interest in the 
residence and the summer home, plaintiff 
subsequently quit-claimed to defendant his 
interest in both properties. The quit-claim 
deeds were later recorded. At the time the 
homeowners' association filed its action in 
which provides that such objections be submitted 
within five days after service of the proposed 
order. After the five-day period had expired, the 
trial court signed plaintiff's proposed order with-
out expressly ruling on defendant's objections. 
The objections were before the trial court; there-
fore, we believe the court implicitly denied plain-
tiffs objections. In any event, the "jime for 
filing [a] notice of appeal begins to run when the 
judgment is entered " Workman v. Nagle 
Summit County, defendant was the sole own-
er of both properties. In view of his quit-
claim deeds to defendant, plaintiffs subse-
quent purchase of the summer home from 
the homeowners' association did not revive 
the cotenancy relationship that existed dur-
ing the parties' marriage. Since there was 
no cotenancy, plaintiff owed no fiduciary duty 
to defendant. 
Collusion 
[5] Defendant argues that plaintiff and 
the homeowners' association colluded in con-
ducting the sheriffs sale of the summer 
home.2 Specifically, defendant argues that 
the homeowners' association sold the summer 
home to plaintiff for a price substantially 
lower than its market value. We believe that 
defendant's argument is without merit. 
Once defendant's redemption period had ex-
pired, she was in no position to challenge the 
homeowners' association's sale of the sum-
mer home to plaintiff since she was a mere 
stranger to the transaction. See, e.g., 33 
C.J.S. Executions § 274 (1942) ("After the 
sale and the expiration of the redemption 
period, the judgment debtor has no such 
interest in the land as will entitle [her] to 
raise objections to the completion of the exe-
cution sale ... , [she] then occupying the 
position of a mere stranger."). Therefore, 
defendant may not complain about the home-
owners' association's sale of the summer 
home to plaintiff. 
Validity of Summit County action 
[6,7] Defendant argues that the fore-
closure proceeding in Summit County estab-
lished no basis to quiet title to the summer 
home in plaintiff. Essentially, defendant at-
tempts to collaterally attack the Summit 
County action by arguing that she did not 
remember receiving service of process in 
that action. This appeal is not, however, the 
Constr, Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 751 n. 4 (Utah App. 
1990). 
2. Defendant also argues that she is entided to 
complete her discovery in order to determine 
whether plaintiff and the homeowners' associa-
tion were in collusion. In light of defendant's 
prolonged failure to respond to the Summit 
County action, this argument is without merit. 
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proper forum to object to the Summit County 
action. See, e.g., Zion's Benefit Bldg. Soc'y 
v. Geary, 112 Utah 548, 553, 189 T2d 964, 
966 (1948) (default judgment from fore-
closure proceeding that was not appealed 
could not be collaterally attacked). Defen-
dant may challenge the validity of the Sum-
mit County action only in the Summit County 
court where all of the parties can be before 
the court.3 
Arrearages 
[8] Defendant's counterclaim for $49,590 
was based upon alleged arrearages for mort-
gage payments, property taxes, insurance, 
repairs to the residence, and child support 
Defendant sought to have plaintiffs alleged 
liability for these amounts adjudged as a lien 
against any interest the court determined 
plaintiff had in the properties. 
The arrearages for both properties oc-
curred after plaintiff had quit-claimed his 
interest in the properties to defendant, or in 
order words, while defendant was the sole 
owner. Therefore, under the facts of this 
case, plaintiff would not be responsible for 
arrearages of properties in which he had no 
interest. 
Defendant also argued a lien should have 
been placed on the summer home against 
plaintiff for child support arrearages. Under 
the facts of this case, we reject this argu-
ment. Nonetheless, we note that the trial 
court's granting of plaintiffs motion for sum-
mary judgment does not preclude defendant 
from bringing an action to collect for alleged 
arrearages in child support We merely hold 
that the trial court properly granted plaintiff 
summary judgment in dismissing such ar-
rearages as a lien on the summer home. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly granted* summary 
judgment for plaintiff. Plaintiff and defen-
dant were not cotenants during the Summit 
County action and, thus, owed no fiduciary 
duty to each other. Defendant's argument 
3. Even if we could address the validity of the 
Summit County action in this appeal, the record 
contains a return of service in the Summit Coun-
ty action. The fact that defendant could not 
remember being served with process would 
with respect to the sales price for the sum-
mer home is without merit The validity of 
the foreclosure proceeding may be attacked 
directly in the Summit County court—not 
collaterally on appeal in this action. It was 
proper for the trial court to dismiss the 
claims for arrearages on summary judgment; 
however, the summary judgment does not 
preclude defendant from attempting to col-
lect arrearages for child support 
The judgment of the trial court is there-
fore affirmed. 
BILLINGS and DAVIS, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jason W. JENNINGS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No, 930604-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 16, 1994. 
Defendant was convicted in the Second 
District Court, Weber County, Stanton M. 
Taylor, J., of criminal solicitation to commit 
murder, and attempted rape of child. Defen-
dant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Greenwood, J., held that record did not sup-
port defendant's claim that he mistakenly 
thought that permission to withdraw guilty 
plea was automatically granted provided that 
motion was timely. 
Affirmed. 
make no difference so long as the service of 
process was valid. See, e.g., Bowen v. Olson, 122 
Utah 66, 74-75, 246 P.2d 602. 605-06 (1952) 
(judgment is void and subject to collateral attack 
if lack of jurisdiction appears on face of record). 
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-15 
to his crops caused by seepage of water from 
defendant city's canal where no claim was pre-
sented therefor to city within a year. Dahl v. 
Salt Lake City, 45 Utah 544, 147 P. 622 (1915) 
(decided under former law). 
Presentation of claim within time fixed by 
law is a condition precedent to bringing action 
against municipality. Brown v. Salt Lake City, 
33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 619, 
126 Am. St. R. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004 (1908); 
Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 
P. 213 (1924) (decided under former law). 
Notice. 
The fact that employees of the county in fact 
knew of the plaintiffs injuries at the time they 
occurred does not dispense with the necessity 
of filing a timely claim. Edwards v. Iron 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 15; 1983, ch. 
129, § 6; 1985, ch. 82, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 7. 
County ex rel. Valley View Medical Center, 
531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975). 
Notice requirement is applicable to 
§ 63-30-9. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 
P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former 
law). 
Notice-of-claim provisions applied to former 
county employee's sex discrimination claims 
arising from acts occurring after the effective 
date of the 1987 amendment, notwithstanding 
her contention that the conduct complained of 
was continuous in nature, stemming from ear-
lier sexual harassment occurring before the ef-
fective date of the amendment. Sauers v. Salt 
Lake County, 735 F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990). 
Cited in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 
(Utah 1985); Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 
(Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations listed un-
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political der § 63-30-11. 
Subdivisions § 680 et seq. Key Numbers. — Counties <&=> 200, 203, 213; 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties §§ 239, 240; 64 Municipal Corporations <&=> 1001, 1005, 1008, 
C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 2173, 2174, 1021; Schools <&=» 112. 
2199; 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts 
§§ 423, 433. 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by gov-
ernmental entity or insurance carrier within 
ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its 
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its 
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end 
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time 
for filing action against governmental entity. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the 
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has 
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
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2199; 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts 
§§ 423, 433. 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by gov-
ernmental entity or insurance carrier within 
ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its 
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its 
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end 
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time 
for filling action against governmental entity. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the 
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has 
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
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Art. VI, § 8 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
now considering, that a term of office fixed by by statute and the time at which a successor 
statute runs not only for the period fixed, but shall be qualified to take the office is as much a 
for an additional period between the date fixed part of the incumbent's term as the fixed statu-
for its termination and the date at which a sue- tory period." State ex rel. Jugler v. Grover, 102 
cessor shall be qualified to take the office, the Utah 41,125 P.2d 807,102 Utah 459,132 PJ2d 
period between the expiration of the term fixed 125 (1942). 
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Sec. 8. [Privilege from arrest] 
Members of the Legislature, in all cases except treason, felony or breach of 
the peace, shall be privileged from arrest during each session of the Legisla-
ture, for fifteen days next preceding each session, and in returning therefrom; 
and for words used in any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be 
questioned in any other place. 
History: Const 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
tive duty, not for their private indulgence, but 
for the public good. The privilege would be of 
little value ifthey could be subjected to the cost 
and inconvenience and distractions of a trial 
upon the conclusions of the pleader, or the haz-
ard of a judgment against them based upon a 
jur/s speculation as to motives. Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 UJS. 367, 71 S. Ct 783, 95 L. 
Ed. 1019 (1951). 
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Sec. 9. [Compensation of legislators — Citizens' salary 
commission.] 
The Legislature shall not increase the salaries of its members on its own 
initiative, but shall provide by law for the appointment by the Governor of a 
citizens' salary commission to make recommendations concerning the salaries 
of members of the Legislature. Upon submission of the commission's recom-
mendations, the Legislature shall by law accept, reject or lower the salary but 
may not, in any event, increase the recommendation. The Legislature shall 
provide by law for the expenses of its members. Until salaries and expenses 
enacted as authorized by this section become effective, members of the Legis-
lature shall receive compensation of $25 per diem while actually in session, 
Purpose of privilege. 
By this section the state took great care to 
preserve the principle that the legislature 
must be free to speak and act without fear of 
criminal and civil liability. Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S. Ct. 783, 95 L. 
Ed. 1019 (1951). 
The claim of an unworthy purpose does not 
destroy this privilege. Legislators are immune 
from the uninhibited discharge of their legisla-
TabK 
son might appeal as matter of right Jensen v. an entry of judgment, nor was it a fi™»1 judg-
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968). ment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Man-
Order denying a motion for summary judg- ning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State 
ment was not a final order and was not appeal- Tax Comm'n v. Erekaon, 714 P2& 1151 (Utah 
able. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah 
571 ?J2d 1359 (Utah 1977). 1986); Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 
A summary judgment in favor of one defen- (Utah 1986). 
dant alone is not a final judgment where the An unsigned minute entry does not consti-
action against the remaining defendant re- tute a final order for purposes of appeal. State 
mains alive. Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d v. Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987). 
1306 (Utah 1983).
 C i t e d ^ H u a t o n y ^ ^ 8 1 g p ^ g 3 1 
Unsigned minute entry. (Utah 1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute (Utah Ct App. 1991). 
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AJJEL — Appealability of order suspending 
imposition or execution of sentence, 51 
AXiUth 939. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. •-
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time maybe ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
fii tha n+har nurtiM in accordance with the rules of nractice of the trial court. 
Kuie * v*~* 
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Administrative actions. 
Attorney fees. 
Cross-appeal. 
Extension of time to appeal. 
—Amendment or modification of judgment. 
Filing of notice. 
Filing with comity clerk. 
Final order or judgment. 
Poet-judgment motions. 
Premature notice. 
Beconsideration of order. 
Timeliness of notice. 
Date of notice. 
Cited. 
Administrative actions. 
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitums to 
review of administrative actions. « t o v ^ 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrud Comm'n, 860 
PJJd 944 (Utah Ct App. 1993). 
Attorney fees. . ._, 
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintoffc 
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in d* 
fending their judgment on appeal. Walks v. 
T b o n 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
°SSSS^W requires that a notice of 
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a oross-ap-
^ a respondent may not attuk the judg-
ment of the court below. Henretty v. Mania 
3 5 £Sni F2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided 
S £ t e t a * r R. Utah S. Ct 4). 
Extension of time to appeaL 
I S Rule 6(b), UJLCJ., grating the 
court power to extend a time limit where a&d-
ore tolct in time is due to excusable neglect 
S i g nor Rule 60(b)(1), UACLP., autho-
S ing the court to reUeve from fin* judgment 
forlnadvertence or excusable neglect applies 
where a notice of appeal has not been timely 
ESLWSSA V. H3*m, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 
an appeal simply by filing a ^ t ^ for Iteom-
£ 5 t o of Order S t r i l ^ Petitionjmd Mo-
L n for ReUef from Final Ju^ent . w Peay v. 
ieay, 607 PJ2d 841 (Utah 1980) 
I S e n the question of -excusable negtect" 
ariaes in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to 
a nonurisdictional context, the standard con-
temriated thereby is a strict one; it IS not 
m S t o c o v e r the usual excuse that the law-
yer is too busy, but is to cover emergency sitaa-
S S d y . ^ w s w o o d , Inc. v. Mountaui Fuel 
iSply Co. 676 PM 962 (Utah 1984). 
Ths'tin* for filing an appeal is junctional 
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v. 
Proner remedy of defendant whose <«ss-ap-
oeal was not timely filed under Subdivision (d), 
^ h a v i n g the n ^ r e t i ^ 
Motion to extend time with the distort court 
" " I T - . «. ._r /-\- u . ^ MHWIIIAIA coart could 
sion, on appeal. Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896 
P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct App. 1996). 
—Amendment or modification of judg-
ment 
If an amendment or modification does not 
change the substance or character of a judg-
ment, it does not enlarge the time for appeaL 
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct App. 
1994). 
Filing of notice. 
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not 
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeaL 
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
Filing with county clerk. 
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely 
filing with the juvenile court, where there was 
no indication when the clerk transmitted a 
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile 
court, and the original was returned to appel-
lants counseL State, In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 
(Utah Ct App. 1989). 
Final order or judgment 
Where the trial court signed two different 
judgments but neither party served his pre-
pared judgment on the other party before sub-
mitting it to the court, the filing of either judg-
ment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken 
from either is premature because the judg-
ments are not properly -final." Larsen v. 
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). 
Juvenile court's order for temporary confine-
ment in a youth facility for observation and 
assessment prior to a final disposition was not 
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it 
did not finally dispose of all issues, including 
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's 
rights as parental custodian. State, In re 
TJD.C, 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct App.), cert de-
nied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
An unsigned minute" entry is not a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment 
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts 
to run on the date when tie trial court enters 
its first signed order denying the motion. 
Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 
1990). 
A signed minute entry ordering defendant's 
counsel to prepare an order showing that plain-
tiffs post-judgment motions filed pursuant to 
Rules 52(b) and 59, U JLC.P., were denied was 
not a ftn*1 appealable order. Swenson Assoes. 
Architects v. State, 254 Utah Adv. Bep. 9 
(Utah 1994). 
Post-judgment motions. 
Where a post-judgment motion was timely 
filed under Rule 59(aX6), U JLCP., to upset the 
judgment and notices of appeal from the judg-
ment were filed after the motion was made, but 
before the disposition of the motion, the motion 
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, ana 
notice of appeal had to be filed within the re-
quired time from the date of the entry tba* 
disposed of the motion. U-M Invs. v. Hay, 668 
P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982). 
